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A new approach to measure
tactical voting: evidence from the
British elections
Daniel Mullera,* and Lionel Pageb
aDepartment of Economics and SFB-884, University of Mannheim,
Mannheim, Germany
bSchool of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of
Technology, Brisbane, Australia
Although tactical voting attracts a great deal of attention, it is very hard to
measure as it requires knowledge of both individuals’ voting choices as well
as their unobserved preferences. In this article, we present a simple empiri-
cal strategy to nonparametrically identify tactical voting patterns directly
from balloting results. This approach allows us to study the magnitude and
direction of strategic voting as well as to verify which information voters
and parties take into account to determinemarginal constituencies.We show
that tactical voting played a signiﬁcant role in the 2010 election, mainly for
Liberal–Democratic voters supporting Labour. Moreover, our results sug-
gest that voters seem to form their expectations based on a national swing in
vote shares rather than newspaper guides published in the main media
outlets or previous election outcomes. We also present some evidence that
suggests that campaign spending is not driving tactical voting.
Keywords: tactical voting; British elections; expectations
JEL Classiﬁcation: H89; D72; D84
All this talk of tactical voting upsets me though –
no-one should EVER have to even think about
voting tactically – you should be able to vote for
the party you want.
Andrew Whickey, a Liberal Democrats blogger,
2010
I. Introduction
Elections are at the very core of democracies. They
are means to give power to the people by allowing for
the expression of their preferences. It has been argued
that, for a democracy to function properly, voters
should face incentives to truthfully reveal their prefer-
ences. Tactical or strategic voting, on the other hand,
refers to a situation when voters do not vote according
to their sincere preferences, typically with the inten-
tion to inﬂuence the outcome in a preferred way.
Tactical voting has long been debated in the poli-
tical science literature.1 It is typically deﬁned as a
situation where it is in a voter’s best interest to vote
for a less preferred candidate, or as Fisher (2004) put
*Corresponding author. E-mail: d.mueller@uni-mannheim.de
1 See, for example, Galbraith and Rae (1989), Johnston and Pattie (1991) and Fieldhouse et al. (1996).
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it, ‘a tactical voter is someone who votes for a party
they believe is more likely to win than their preferred
party, to best inﬂuence who wins in the constituency’
(Fisher, 2004, p. 157).2 In general, there are at least
two ways to vote strategically. First, a voter can vote
for a less preferred candidate because the favourite
candidate’s chances of winning are low (which is
sometimes called ‘positive strategic voting’).
Second, a voter can decide to vote for a less preferred
candidate in order to increase the chances of winning
for the preferred candidate (‘negative strategic vot-
ing’), see Southwell (1991).
With very close results predicted by the pre-elec-
tion polls, the issue of tactical voting in the British
elections of 2010was amore hotly debated topic than
ever before.3 Key ﬁgures in the Labour Party –
including Alan Johnson (Home Secretary), Ed Balls
(Children’s Secretary) and Peter Hain (Wales
Secretary) – called for backing the best Liberal/
Labour candidate to beat the Conservative candidates
in marginal (that is, close) constituencies. Compass, a
Union organization, supported tactical voting and
designed a voting guide for tactical voting in margin-
als. Numerous left-leaning newspapers advised
voters to vote tactically and many proposed voting
guides, for example, the Daily Mirror, the Guardian,
Independent and New Statesman. Given this speciﬁc
situation, in particular the calls from some well-
known politicians in the Labour Party itself, one
may expect tactical voting to have been signiﬁcantly
higher than in precedent elections.
Reducing incentives to tactical voting was also a
key argument in the debate surrounding the refer-
endum in 2011 to change the voting system in the
United Kingdom from First-Past-The-Post (FPTP)
to alternative voting (AV).4 One of the major
criticisms made by the opponents of the traditional
voting system used in Britain is that it fosters
tactical voting to the beneﬁt of the two main parties
and hence potentially hinders representation
according to the true preferences (Electoral
Reform Society, 2010).
Besides the large attention tactical voting has
received from experts, layman and the media, there
are considerable difﬁculties when estimating strate-
gic behaviour in elections. These difﬁculties mainly
arise from the fact that in order to study this phenom-
enon, knowledge of the political preferences as well
as of the actual vote cast is necessary. Using survey
data might be a natural approach but is obviously
plagued with several difﬁculties like recall bias
(respondents typically have ﬂawed memories about
their past behaviour) and social desirability bias (tac-
tical voting might be seen as socially undesirable and
hence it is concealed). A more indirect way used to
identify strategic voting is to model individual (or
constituency) characteristics in order to estimate
counterfactual vote choices (or election outcomes)
with and without the possibility to vote tactically.
This approach typically employs discrete choice
models like probits. A problem with this approach
is that one needs to make the strong assumption that
conditional on observables there are no omitted fac-
tors inﬂuencing vote choices (or trends in party
shares respectively). This supposition seems some-
times hard to justify in reality.
In this article, we propose a novel nonparametric
strategy to analyse electoral data, which allows us to
study tactical voting patterns in the latest British
election. This approach relies on visual inspection
of the change in party shares in 2005 versus the 2010
elections as a function of the Labour – Conservative,
Liberal Democrats – Conservatives vote share differ-
ences, respectively. While this approach avoids the
caveats of the aforementioned strategies, it comes at
the cost that the magnitude of tactical voting has to
be ‘eye-balled’ from the plotted data, that is the
approach does not easily deliver precise
statistical estimates of the size of tactical voting.
Nevertheless, it allows us to examine the importance
of the phenomena and additionally we are able to
study several related questions. It seems that tactical
voting played a signiﬁcant role in the last general
election in the United Kingdom. According to our
2 It has become common to refer to this phenomena as ‘tactical voting’ in the context of the British election and as ‘strategic
voting’ in the US elections. Here, we do not make this distinction and use the terms interchangeably.
3 The closeness of the election that year was due to the speciﬁc national swing observed which in turn was likely driven by
short-term changes in the popularity of the different parties.
4 In alternative voting systems, or instant run-off voting, instead of voting for a single candidate, voters rank the candidates
in order of their preferences. The votes are then counted and candidates ranked as a function of the ‘ﬁrst preferences’, then
the lower ranked candidates are eliminated and the votes in their favour are transferred to the next best preferred candidates
of their voters.
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estimates, mainly former Liberal Democratic voters
supported Labour in constituencies where a close
race between Labour and the Conservatives was
expected.5
Moreover, this approach allows us to make three
further contributions to the tactical voting literature.
First, we study the information sets voters use to form
expectations about election outcomes, using the 2010
general election as an example. We ﬁnd some evi-
dence that voters seem to be more sophisticated than
voting guides compiled by British newspapers and
based their expectations on a nationwide uniform
swing assumption (which performed better in pre-
dicting election outcomes). Second, we discuss the
relevance of campaign spending in this context and
present some evidence that it does not seem to have a
major inﬂuence on voter’s choices. Third, we test the
prediction that the propensity to vote tactically
increases with the winning margin once the
(expected) distance of the third party in the race is
controlled for, which is what some theoretical evi-
dence is suggesting (Myatt, 2007). We test this pre-
diction using a general additive model and, in
contrast to this prediction, we ﬁnd that tactical voting
seems to be highest in close races even after control-
ling for the distance from contention.
The remainder of the article is organized as fol-
lows. Section II sets our article in relation to the
strategic voting literature. Section III shows that tac-
tical voting patterns suggest voters used uniform
swing models to determine marginal constituencies.
Section IV looks at the party spending patterns and
their inﬂuence on vote shares. In Section V we show
that the distance of the third party does not seem to
inﬂuence voting behaviour. Section VI discusses the
results and concludes.
II. Relation to Literature on Tactical
Voting
Although the well-known Gibbard–Satterthwaite
theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975)
shows that the search for strategy-proof voting sys-
tems is doomed to fail, some systems may be more or
less prone than other to inducing strategic behaviour.
In particular, the FPTP system seems to be particularly
prone to strategic considerations by the voters.6 The
propensity of the FPTP system to foster tactical voting
has long been suggested (Duverger, 1954). What was
initially a conjecture is now known as ‘Duverger’s
law’, see also Riker (1982). Palfrey (1989) proposed
a mathematical proof of this ‘law’, showing that in a
model with rational voters and three parties, only two
parties end up having positive vote shares. In this
setting, non-Duvergean equilibria can appear in rare
occasions when two parties are tied for second place.
The electoral reality sometimes departs from this pre-
diction though. Whilst the political history of the
United Kingdom has shown that the FPTP system is
clearly associated with a two-party system (Labour
and Conservatives), there is usually a third minor
party, the Liberal Democrats, which has experienced
signiﬁcant growth over the recent years. To explain
such a discrepancy, Myatt (2007) has proposed a
model where, contrary to Palfrey’s hypothesis, voters
have imperfect information on the preferences of other
voters, which prevents full coordination of tactical
voters on their best contender. For instance, in a situa-
tion with two left-wing candidates and one right-wing
candidate, some potential left-wing (tactical) voters
may fail to identify their best strategic option.7
Besides theoretical attempts to explain the
observed patterns of tactical voting, there have been
numerous empirical studies trying to quantify tactical
voting patterns. Naturally most studies look at the
British general elections.8
Nevertheless, there are also studies that look at US
primaries, see, for example, Abramson et al. (1992)
and Cain and Gerber (2002). In general, there are
three approaches to estimate tactical voting.9
The indirect approach relies on modelling counter-
factual voting choices (that is, with and without the
opportunity to vote tactically) using observable con-
stituency (or individual) characteristics. Studies
using this approach typically attempt to estimate the
5We will discuss later on in more detail how these expectations can be formed.
6But it is certainly not the only system where strategic voting can be expected. For example, Meffert and Gschwend (2010)
andMcCuen andMorton (2010) ﬁnd empirical evidence of tactical coalition voting in a proportional representation system,
that is voters might try to vote such that they maximize the winning probability of their preferred coalition.
7 Cox (1997) provides a comprehensive investigation of this topic.
8 See, for example, Niemi et al. (1992), Johnston and Pattie (1991), Lanoue and Bowler (1992), Alvarez and Nagler (2000)
and Fisher (2000).
9Blais et al. (2005) provide a comparison of the two main approaches – the direct and the indirect one.
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impact of perceived closeness of the race in each
district on voting choices and then include explana-
tory variables that are supposed to measure exactly
this. For example, Blais et al. (2005) use a probit
model to determine how a vote is cast and include the
perceived probability of a candidate winning in this
model, which is, they argue, indicative for tactical
voting. Using Canadian elections as an example, they
ﬁnd that around 4% of the voters seem to have voted
insincerely. Cain (1978) suggests that tactical voting
is higher in those seats marked as marginals based on
the results of the previous elections. He also employs
a logit model approach and ﬁnds some indications for
tactical voting. Alvarez and Nagler (2000) (and simi-
larly, Alvarez et al. (2006)) estimate a multinomial
probit model of voter choices based on survey data
and include a measure of expected closeness of the
parties in each district as explanatory variable.10
They interpret this measure as the likelihood that a
vote is wasted and hence as the potential for strategic
voting. They ﬁnd that around 8% of voters voted
strategically, which is roughly in line with other
estimates.11
However, this approach relies on the assumptions
that voting decisions are completely determined by
observables and on the accuracy of the answers when
survey data are exploited. Both suppositions are
rather unlikely to be fulﬁlled in reality. Also, they
typically rely on a measure of closeness of the elec-
toral race in a constituency, it is however unclear how
voters form expectations. Our article contributes to
this problem, as it allows us to make statements about
how sophisticated voters form their expectations. We
ﬁnd some evidence that they are not purely back-
ward-looking, but more sophisticated.
The direct approach exploits survey data, mainly
the British Election Study, which provides pre- and
post-election survey data, including questions on the
effective vote, the ﬁrst choice party, or the reason for
voting (and whether it was explicitly cast for tactical
purposes). Studies using the British Election Survey
typically ﬁnd that around 5% to 10% of voters cast
their ballot strategically. Fisher (2000), for example,
estimates that around 5% in 1987, 7.7% in 1992 and
8.5% in 1997 voted insincerely. These numbers also
suggest that tactical voting has slightly increased in
the last decades.12 However, survey studies face
numerous difﬁculties, which may be particularly pro-
blematic in the study of tactical voting. First, answers
to questions on tactical voting may be affected by the
well-known recall bias in political surveys, which
systematically advantages the winning parties, see
Himmelweit et al. (1978) and Eubank and Gow
(1983). In a situation with two major parties, this
bias could exaggerate the number of tactical voters
in their favour. Second, survey questions on tactical
voting may be affected by a social desirability bias.
There is extensive evidence that tactical voting is
seen as socially undesirable (or even unethical) by
some voters. Hence there may be incentives to con-
ceal a tactical vote, see Galbraith and Rae (1989).
Finally, if voters cast their vote strategically, they can
also be strategic in their answers to political surveys.
Meirowitz (2005) shows that tactical considerations
can also lead to misdeclaration of preferences in
polls. If respondents perceive political surveys in a
similar way as polls, they may well choose to answer
tactically. They could, for example, hide that they
voted tactically to prop up the proportion of voters
for their ﬁrst-choice party. These problems cast doubt
on the validity of surveys that ask voters to truthfully
reveal their intentions.13
The third approach infers patterns of strategic vot-
ing from aggregate level electoral data. Particularly it
involves estimating vote swings on a district level,
for example, using ﬂow-of-the-vote matrices, from
which tactical voting patterns are deduced.14
Johnston and Pattie (1992) estimate ﬂow-of-the-vote
matrices for the British elections of 1983 and 1987.
They ﬁnd some evidence for tactical voting and that
10 Interestingly, and related to the article at hand, they assume that expectations are formed based on the previous election
result. This assumption is strong and is, as we will show later on, empirically most likely not accurate.
11 See also Lanoue and Bowler (1998), Blais and Nadeau (1996), Kim and Fording (2001) and Blais et al. (2001) for studies
using the indirect approach of measuring tactical voting.
12 See also Duch and Palmer (2002), Heath and Evans (1994), Niemi et al. (1992) and Niemi et al. (1993) for studies using
the direct approach.
13 See also Wright (1990), Wright (1992) and Atkeson (1999) regarding vote misreporting issues and Alvarez and
Nagler (2000) who provide a more detailed critique of the empirical tactical voting literature. Blais et al. (2005) discuss
advantages and disadvantages of both approaches in more detail.
14 See, for instance, McCarthy and Ryan (1977) and Upton (1978) for early transition probability estimates (although they
do not consider tactical voting in particular).
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it was strongest in marginal constituencies.15
Galbraith and Rae (1989) use electoral results and
demographic information on the constituencies to
check whether similar electorates voted differently
depending on the relative position of the contenders
at the last election. They also conclude that there are
empirical indications for strategic voting. However,
this approach naturally runs into the ‘ecological
inference problem’ (King, 1997), which refers to
the problem of deducing micro-level behaviour
from macro-level data. In general the usefulness of
aggregate level data for individual level inference
seems questionable.
This article is different from other papers in that it
cannot be classiﬁed under one of the three cate-
gories mentioned above. We do not rely on survey
data but solely on actual vote choices. Moreover,
our approach does neither build on modelling vote
choices accurately using available observable char-
acteristics nor on ecological regressions. Instead we
nonparametrically estimate the change in vote
shares between two parties as a function of the
previous election result using constituency level
data. This technique allows us to avoid all detri-
ments of the common three main approaches for
measuring tactical voting.16 We see our approach
as complimentary and not as a replacement for
others. It allows us to study expectation formation
of British voters since we are able to compare the
plotted estimates under different expectation forma-
tion assumptions.
Although it has been widely recognized that peo-
ple’s expectations about election outcomes play a
vital role in determining strategic behaviour, it has
not been studied more closely until now. Research in
this area usually takes past election results as best
guess for future results in order to determine mar-
ginal constituencies in the upcoming election.17 It is
however doubtful whether this is in fact the best
description of the average voter’s behaviour. We
will discuss that issue in more detail in the next
section. One of the few studies that looks more clo-
sely into this is Lago (2008). He uses survey data
from Spain to retrieve information on political
knowledge and concludes that people mainly form
their expectations about political outcomes using
heuristics. Hence voters do not seem to be comple-
tely sophisticated and forward-looking. Nadeau
et al. (1994) provide a study of expectation formation
among British voters. Among other things, they ﬁnd
that voters do not seem to be fully sophisticated when
forming their expectation. Looking at the 1988
Canadian election, Blais and Bodet (2006) conclude
that voters form their expectations based ‘on the basis
of both “objective” contextual information and their
own personal preferences’ (Blais and Bodet, 2006,
p. 488). Lastly, Meffert et al. (2011) look at multi-
party systems in Germany and Austria to investigate
which factors determine the quality and precision of
the expectation of the electorate.
A different but related issue is that of strategic
voter turnout. Before voters decide whether to cast a
strategic vote or not, they have to decide whether to
vote at all or to abstain. One strand of literature has
emerged that examines the relationship between the
expected closeness of the electoral race and turnout.
Rational choice theory predicts that voters react to
the probability of being pivotal and hence also to the
expected closeness. While the empirical evidence is
not completely conclusive, it seems that there is by
now a consensus that increased expected closeness of
the electoral race increases voter turnout. For exam-
ple, Shachar and Nalebuff (1999) present empirical
evidence for this relation in the US presidential elec-
tions, as predicted by rational choice theory. They
also provide a theoretical framework that is able to
accommodate this observation. Moreover, Endersby
et al. (2002) ﬁnd a strong and positive relation
between turnout and closeness in Canadian federal
elections. Looking at the United States, British and
French elections, respectively, Cox and Munger
(1989), Pattie and Johnston (2001) and Fauvelle-
Aymar and François (2006) also report empirical
evidence for a positive relation between closeness
and voter participation. Matsusaka (1993), on the
other hand, does not ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant rela-
tion between both variables looking at Californian
elections and Kirchgässner and Zu Himmern (1997)
15 See also Fieldhouse et al. (1996) and Johnston et al. (1997).
16As mentioned before, our approach needs a distinct identiﬁcation assumption and comes at the cost of not allowing for
point estimates. Naturally, all empirical strategies come along with some advantages and some drawbacks.
17 See Alvarez and Nagler (2000), for example.
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report only mixed evidence from East and West-
German elections.18
Tactical voting worldwide
As mentioned before, tactical voting behaviour is
overwhelmingly associated with the FPTP system in
Great Britain. Nevertheless, it has been shown that no
electoral system is theoretically immune against stra-
tegic considerations and hence tactical voting can be
expected to occur in other (democratic) countries as
well. Here, we brieﬂy summarize the sparse interna-
tional evidence from other countries on the extent of
tactical voting. We organize the discussion around
four different systems: FPTP, Run-off-, proportional-
and AV. An excellent additional source is Cox (1997).
The FPTP system is also partly used in the United
States. In such a ‘winner takes all’ system, onemight be
tempted to think that all votes for a third party might
mean supporting the winning party. Hence, under
FPTP the ‘wasted vote’ logic might be particularly
prevalent and signiﬁcantly distort the results. One
example from the United States is the Gore versus
Bush presidential election of 2002 where a left-wing
candidate impacted on the overall result in favour of
Bush (Burden and Jones, 2009). Nevertheless, there
does not seem to be a reliable quantiﬁcation of the
amount of strategic voting in the United States.
Run-off elections (a two-round voting system
where typically only two candidates proceed to the
second round) are in general thought of as minimizing
opportunities to cast a wasted vote. Such a voting
system is, for example, used in France. Nevertheless,
opportunities for ‘compromise voting’ (voting for one
of the three leading candidates in the ﬁrst round) and
‘push over’ voting (voting for an unpopular candidate
in order to increase the chances that the preferred
candidate meets the unpopular one in the second
round) occur. Again, there does not seem to be reliable
evidence of amount of tactical voting under run-off
elections.
The proportional voting (PR) system is currently
applied in a majority of countries worldwide. Similar
to the run-off voting system mentioned before, scho-
lars typically believe that tactical voting is less of a
problem relative the FPTP system since the opportu-
nities to cast a wasted votes are rarer. Hence compared
to two systems before, there are probably less incen-
tives to vote strategically (Ganser and Veuger, 2010).
Abramson et al. (2009) however compare strategic
voting under FPTP and PR challenge that conclusion.
They argue that because there are typically more small
parties under PR systems there are also more oppor-
tunities to waste a vote. Looking at elections in
Mexico, the United States, Britain, Israel and the
Netherlands they seem to conﬁrm these conclusions.
Gschwend et al. (2004) show that strategic voting is
also present in Finland which, they argue, is a parti-
cularly hard testing ground due to particularities of the
voting system. In the PR systems, also opportunities
for strategic coalition voting arise that are not present
under FPTP voting. Bowler et al. (2010) ﬁnd evidence
for strategic coalition voting in New Zealand; Meffert
and Gschwend (2010) for Austria. McCuen and
Morton (2010) present evidence from laboratory elec-
tions. Blais (2002) on the other hand ﬁnds little evi-
dence for strategic voting in Canadian plurality
elections.
The last system mentioned here in more detail is the
AV system as, for instance, used in Australia where
there are no ‘wasted votes’ as votes for an eliminated
candidate are transferred to the next best preferred
candidate on the ballot. This is considered as a factor
limiting the likelihood of tactical voting in this system.
Gschwend (2004) also argues that the amount of tac-
tical voting is smaller under AV systems because voting
strategically under the AV system requires knowledge
of the complete ranking of candidates by other voters.
III. A New Approach to Identify Tactical
Voting
Empirical strategy and voters’ subjective beliefs in
election outcomes
Voters willing to consider a tactical vote face a key
problem: they have to identify the constituencies
where switching from a sincere vote to a tactical
vote is desirable and those where it is not neces-
sary or even counterproductive. Hence, voters’
information and beliefs about election outcomes
play a key role. Typically, tactical votes should be
concentrated in constituencies identiﬁed by voters
18Additionally, there is a large literature on strategic abstention in elections when voters do not have perfect information
about the state of the world. In that case, some voters are potentially better informed than others. This line of research has
produced some interesting theoretical and experimental results and is especially connected with the work by Feddersen and
Pesendorfer (1996), who show that less informed voters may strictly prefer to abstain even when voting is costless.
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as marginal where the effect of a tactical vote for
a better placed party is most likely to have an
impact.
This fact underlies our empirical strategy. The
set of constituencies which are marginal in one
general election is not necessarily the same in the
subsequent election. Between two elections, the
national variations in popularity of the two main
parties affect their winning chances in each con-
stituency. When the governing party suffers from
low popularity, previously safe constituencies are
in danger of falling to the opposition. This is
indeed the situation which the Labour party faced
in 2010. After 13 years in government, Labour
party suffered from a drop in popularity with an
expected swing in favour of the Conservative party
of around 8%.
When a national swing changes a ‘safe’ seat into a
‘marginal’ seat, one should see stronger tactical vot-
ing patterns there relative to the previous general
elections. By changing the set of constituencies
which are marginal from one election to the other, a
national swing entails an exogenous variation in
‘marginality’which we use to identify tactical voting
patterns.
We should observe that new marginal seats exhibit
stronger patterns of tactical voting than in previous
elections, with third-party voters partly opting for
their second best option. These patterns can be iden-
tiﬁed by plotting the change in vote shares between
2005 and 2010 as a function of the 2005 Labour/
Conservative (Liberal Democratic/Conservative,
respectively) vote share difference. We use nonpara-
metric local polynomial regression to do so.
Moreover, there may be several ways for voters to
form beliefs about which constituencies are marginal
or not. Our nonparametric approach allows us to
examine which ones are considered to be marginals
and which ones not by voters. This information can
then be used to test for several layers of sophistica-
tion of voters when forming beliefs about the likely
results of the election in their constituency.
The different types of voter sophistication
A voter willing to know whether his or her constitu-
ency is a marginal one faces a nontrivial problem.
There are several ways to form beliefs about the
marginality of a constituency. We consider four
different ways, which can intuitively be understood
as nested information sets – from the smallest set to
the largest.
First of all, tactical voters could be naively back-
ward-looking and simply form their beliefs based on
the previous election outcome. In this case, tactical
voting would be worthwhile in constituencies that
have been closely contested in 2005. Although this
might seem naive initially, the voting guides pub-
lished by the Mirror and the Independent were con-
structed exactly in this way.
Second, a more sophisticated technique would
include some forward-looking information and add
to the previous electoral results a forecast of the
national vote swing. Such an approach would require
the inclusion of national opinion polls to make a
forecast. Whilst this technique is quite coarse, it
was at the core of the very popular ‘swingometers’
on which media and parties extensively relied during
the campaign to forecast the makeup of the next
parliament. For this reason, we can suspect that
many voters who are interested in a tactical ballot
relied on a uniform swing assumption to form their
expectations of the local results. Indeed in the
Section ‘Backward-looking approach and uniform
swing pre-diction’, we present empirical support
that voters use the uniform swing prediction and
not the backward-looking approach to inform them-
selves about the potential closeness of the electoral
race in their corresponding constituency.19
Third, an even more elaborated voter could add
constituency-speciﬁc information to form expecta-
tions about election results in her constituency, such
as a scandal affecting the re-election of the incum-
bent MP are of course relevant pieces of information.
To consider these well-informed voters, we use data
from betting markets. There is clear evidence that
betting markets are very well able to aggregate avail-
able information, see Arrow et al. (2008) andWolfers
and Zitzewitz (2004), for instance. This is so because
well-informed market participants have more incen-
tives to bet and therefore will have an impact on the
odds. During the campaign, bookmaker offered odds
for all the major parties in each constituency. These
odds aggregate all available (local) information in
addition to the national forecasts. We will use these
odds as a proxy for a well-informed forecast by a
sophisticated voter. Betting is quite popular in the
19Two swingometers are available at the BBC homepage at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/election_2010/
8609989.stm> and at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/election_2010/8574653.stm>.
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United Kingdom and it seems reasonable to assume
that a sophisticated voter could use betting odds to
form expectations about the likely result in a
constituency.
Fourth, one could consider the unlikely possibility
that voters had perfect information – or, alternatively,
that they had perfect expectations (Hicks, 1946),
such that they were able to anticipate ex-ante which
constituencies would end up being the closest in the
ﬁnal results. We examine this consideration in
Section ‘Perfect predictions: using the 2010 results’.
Maybe not surprisingly, this does not seem to be a
realistic assumption.
Backward-looking approach and uniform swing
prediction
It seems reasonable to assume that voters might use a
uniform swing model to form expectations about the
closeness of the race in their constituency, which
implies assuming that changes in party vote shares
will occur homogeneously across the country.
Although this approach might not be completely
realistic, it seems at least to be a simple and effective
way to predict the results. Backward-looking voters
can be seen as using a speciﬁc case of the uniform
swing where the expected swing is zero. The seats
with close results in the previous elections are then
the ones considered as marginals in the current
election.
Most of the discussions about tactical voting were
aimed at Labour and Liberal Democrat voters aiming
to vote against the Conservatives. We therefore
restrict our analysis to constituencies where either
the Labour or the Liberal Democrats were the
main opponents of the Conservatives – Labour/
Conservative and Liberal Democrats/Conservatives
seats. In order to study the marginal seats, we select
all seats where the corresponding main two parties
are expected to be close according to the opinion
polls before the election. We also eliminated seats
which could be considered as three-way marginals,
where the third party was pretty close from the sec-
ond party.20 We are left with 255 Labour/
Conservatives and 126 Liberal Democrats/
Conservatives constituencies. Table 1 displays the
changes in party vote shares that could be deduced
from the last opinion polls before election day.
Since there was a change in constituencies
between 2005 and 2010, we use the notional results
of 2005 of the new constituencies, which were esti-
mated for the Press Association, BBC, ITN and Sky
News by Rallings and Thrasher (2007). All media
used these results during the campaign in order to
quantify the evolution of political forces in the
United Kingdom. Those notional results estimated
the shares the different parties would have obtained
in 2005 in each constituency given the new 2010
boundaries.21
Our approach to identify tactical voting relies on
estimating nonparametrically the change in vote
shares between 2005 and 2010 for the three parties
for each constituency as a function of the 2005 dif-
ference in Labour-Conservative vote shares (Liberal
Democrat–Conservative, respectively). This will
allow us to study the relation between the (expected)
tightness of the race and tactical voting behaviour as
well as to examine which information voters used to
form their expectations. We use local linear regres-
sions and a bandwidth selected by cross validation
(Stone, 1974) to estimate this relationship. Figure 1
displays these estimations with additional 95% con-
ﬁdence intervals for each party.
There are two variants of the uniform swing
assumption. The ﬁrst one expects marginal
Table 1. Actual election results and predictions averaged for three different opinion poll companies (Polls of Polls,
ComRes and ICM), published on the election day
Conservatives Labour Liberal Democrats Others
Results and polls Share Swing Share Swing Share Swing Share Swing
2005 Results 33.2% – 36.1% – 22.6% – 8.0% –
Average prediction 36.3% 3.1% 28% −8.1% 27% 4.4% 8.7% 0.7%
2010 Results 36.1% 2.9% 29.0% –7.1% 23% 0.4% 11.9% 3.9%
20Details on the selection of constituencies are provided in the ‘Appendix’.
21We describe in the ‘Appendix’ how these notional results are built.
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constituencies to be those where the Labour party
won with a 11.2-point margin in 2005 (from Table 1,
the sum of the loss for the Conservatives and the
gain from the Labour is: 3.1 − (−8.1) = 11.2). The
second method is even more straightforward. Voters
living in a constituency where the race is between
Labour and Conservatives may be concerned with a
swing from Labour to Conservatives only, that is,
they look purely at the swing between those two
parties regardless of the change in the shares of
other parties. Therefore voters may apply a symme-
trical uniform swing to predict the vote shares of the
two parties. They would then expect Labour to lose
8.1 points and the Conservatives to exactly gain this
amount, and, therefore, tight races where the Labour
won by a 16.2-points margin in 2005. We added
vertical lines at these values in the left panel of
Fig. 1. Strikingly, the extrema of these curves for
Labour and Liberal Democrats are located exactly
between the two lines, that is, where expectations
based on the uniform swing assumption predicted a
tight race.
For both panels in Fig. 1, the change in the share of
Conservatives does not seem to depend on the tight-
ness of the electoral race, no matter how tight the race
is expected to be. Instead the Conservatives gained
around 4−5% irrespective of the 2005 vote share
difference relative to the other parties. On the other
hand, for the Labour party and Liberal Democrats
there are clear indications that the changes in voting
shares strongly depend on the tightness of the elec-
toral race as predicted by the uniform swing assump-
tion. There is a signiﬁcant change around 10–15%
points in favour of the Labour party at the costs of the
liberal parties (left panel).
On the other hand, Liberal Democrats seem to
proﬁt in constituencies where they and the
Conservatives have been close in 2005 (right
panel). A uniform swing assumption based on the
polls would have predicted a tight race in constitu-
encies where the Conservatives had won by a
1.3-points margin (4.4 − 3.1) in 2005. And in fact,
there seem to be some indications here that voters
switched strategically to the Liberals in these consti-
tuencies. However, there is no sign that those who
voted for Labour in the previous election voted tacti-
cally to support the Liberal democrats in these seats,
but instead the surplus may come from voters who
otherwise would not have voted. A possible explana-
tion is that voters in these constituencies did not get
the same amount of information as in Labour/
Conservative districts, for example, due to smaller
media coverage. As a result, whilst Liberal voters had
plenty of opportunities to form expectations about
the marginality of their seat using the uniform swing
model, Labour voters in Liberal Democrat–
Conservative seats may have had much less oppor-
tunity to ﬁnd out in the media whether there was a
close race expected in their seat. A higher degree of
uncertainty about the status of their seats may have
induced Labour voters to keep voting sincerely.
These results suggest two things. First, the sym-
metric evolution of the changes in vote shares of the
Labour and the Liberal Democratic party and the fact
that the vote share of the Conservatives seems to be
unaffected by the expected closeness of the race
provides strong evidence for the existence of tactical
voting. Second, the fact that this pattern appears for
constituencies predicted to be marginal by a uniform
swingmethod suggests that voters were sophisticated
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Fig. 1. Change in vote shares in the Labour versus Conservatives (left) and Liberal versus Conservatives seats
(right), depending on the Labour/Liberal-Conservative 2005 vote share difference. Local linear regression, band-
width selected by cross validation
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enough to do more than just naively use the shares
from the last general election as such. They
were forward-looking, incorporating predictions on
changes in vote shares to form their expectations.
This may not appear as a big surprise, but we should
remember that both The Mirror and The Independent
published voting guides that pretty much relied on
such static expectations. Both these voting guides
selected seats where the Labour had won by a margin
from 0% to 8% in 2005. Given that the uniform
swing predicted in the media was around 8%, voting
guides should have focused on seats where the
Labour margin was around 8% at the last election.
In practice, many of these voting guides included
seats with close results in 2005 and where the results
were very unlikely be close in 2010.
The impact of newspaper voting guides
The results presented before suggest that the media
outlets seem to have failed to identify the constitu-
encies where tactical voting would have been most
effective. For example, out of the 52 Labour/
Conservatives constituencies where The Mirror
guide recommended that Liberal Democratic parti-
sans should vote for the Labour party, only ﬁve were
won by the Labour party. Our analysis above points
in the same direction: it suggests that voting guides
were probably not driving the voting decision. In the
case of the marginal Labour/Conservatives seats, we
are able to examine the effect of the voting guides
published by The Mirror and The Independent in
more detail. This is so because these guides relied
on the 2005 differences in vote shares, but did not
recommend to vote tactically in exactly the same
seats as the uniform swing assumption suggested to
do. The newspaper guides included constituencies
where Labour won by a margin of zero to eight
percentage points in 2005 and hence typically failed
the predict accurately the close constituencies.
If there was any effect of the voting guide, one
should observe a difference between the constituen-
cies that were included and those which were not
included. To test this hypothesis, we look at the
guide published by The Mirror, a newspaper which
has a large distribution (1.2 million copies in 2010).
Besides that, the guide was very similar to the ones
from The Independent or Compass.
Figure 2 shows the box plot of the results in the
seats included in TheMirror’s guide versus those just
left out. The constituencies included had Labour
winning by a margin of 4 to 8 percentage points in
2005, while those not included had the Labour win-
ning by a margin of 8 to 12. There is no indication of
any effect of the guide on this subsample of seats.
Labour does not perform better in the seats included
in the guide, and Liberal Democrats do not perform
worse in these seats either. This same result is
observed for The Independent voting guides. (The
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Fig. 2. The absence of an effect of the Mirror’s voting guide. Results in Labour/Conservatives marginals included
in the Mirror guide versus marginals not included in the Mirror guide. The guide does not statistically signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence the vote share of the Labour party or the Liberal Democrats
3848 D. Muller and L. Page
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [Q
ue
en
sla
nd
 U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 T
ec
hn
olo
gy
] a
t 1
8:2
7 1
9 M
ay
 20
15
 
Guardian provided an online voting guide, which is
not available anymore.) This suggests that voting
guides had no signiﬁcant effect on the electoral
results.22
The absence of an effect may be due to a failure to
reach a large number of voters. In spite of large
circulation numbers, the cumulated ﬁgures of circu-
lation for all the voting guides (1.6 million copies in
2010) are still small relative to the size of the electo-
rate. Another possible explanation is that the readers
of these guides are not signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by
them because they form their expectations in a more
sophisticated way.
Bookmakers’ predictions
There is a substantial amount of evidence that
shows that bookmakers typically give very accu-
rate estimates of the probabilities for certain
future events23 and in particular of election results
(Rhode and Strumpf, 2004). Bookmakers will try
to incorporate all available knowledge, like, for
example, the relative strength of local candidates,
a local political scandal (which might have been
particularly relevant given the large number of
MPs involved in the expenses scandal in 2010)
and so on. In that sense, bookmakers’ predictions
should be much better on average than the
national swing prediction, which is entirely ignor-
ant of local characteristics.24
We collected odds for each constituency from the
Ladbrokes website preceding the elections, around
the 30th of April. Out of the 243 Labour/
Conservatives constituencies for which bookmakers’
data are available, 219 winners have been correctly
predicted (slightly overestimating the performance of
the Conservatives: 22 of these mistakes consisted of
incorrectly announcing a Conservatives victory). In
comparison, over the same 243 seats, static anticipa-
tions gave only 161 correct winners, and forecasts
based on the uniform swing assumption (translating
the shares of all parties) predicted 212 winners cor-
rectly. Book-makers have therefore clearly provided
the best-forecast predictions among the different
techniques we have considered. A voter considering
to vote tactically could easily use bookmakers’ odds
to determine marginal seats. These are the constitu-
encies where two candidates are close to a 50%
chance of winning.
We employ the same method as before and plot the
changes in vote shares between 2005 and 2010 as a
function of the tightness of the race deﬁned by the
winning probabilities implied by the odds. If voters
react tactically to the marginality of a constituency,
we should observe an increase in the Labour’s vote
share peaking at 50%.
The left panel of Fig. 3 displays the corresponding
results for Labour/Conservative constituencies. The
Conservatives’ change in vote share is here again
independent of the winning probability as deﬁned
by bookmakers’ odds. Strikingly, we do observe an
increase in the change in Labour’s and a decrease in
the Liberal Democrats vote share around the 50%
limit. However, the peak and dip are much less pro-
nounced than using the uniform swing predictions in
the Section ‘Backward–looking approach and uni-
form swing pre-diction’. Bookmakers’ predictions
are however highly correlated with the uniform
national swing predicted by the polls and hence the
results might be partly confounded. Interestingly,
there is no such peak for the Liberal Democratic
votes in Liberal Democrats/Conservatives seats
(right panel), which seems to support the conclusions
from the Section ‘Backward–looking approach and
uniform swing pre-diction’. All in all, this analysis
again not only provides some indications for the
presence of tactical voting, but also suggests that
voters mainly used the uniform swing predictions to
determine marginal constituencies. It is mainly the
Labour party that proﬁts from tactical voting beha-
viour and not so much the Liberals.
Perfect predictions: using the 2010 results
Finally, another possibility is that voters form perfect
expectations and correctly predict which seats will be
22This is in line with the study by Lanoue and Bowler (1992), who found that the media did not seem to have a signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on tactical voting in 1983 and 1987.
23 See Ali (1979), Pope and Peel (1989), Franck et al. (2010), Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) and Arrow et al. (2008).
24According to the 2010 British Gambling prevalence survey which surveyed a representative sample of the British
population, 43% of the respondents had gambled the week before participating in the survey (British Prevalence Survey
2010, p. 23). Additional evidence of the importance of gambling activities in Great Britain comes from Rosenbaum (1999),
who states that betting at British General Elections is a popular pastime which ‘involves many members of the general
public and large sums of money’ (Rosenbaum, 1999, p. 1).
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the closest. Using the same method as before, it is
possible to look at changes in vote shares as a func-
tion of the 2010 differences between Labour and
Conservatives (Lib-Dem/Conservatives, respec-
tively). This is problematic in the sense that seats
that happened to experience a positive shock on
Labour (or Lib-Dems, respectively) votes will
mechanically tend to be higher in the 2010 results.
As a consequence, the ﬁtted curve of the changes in
share for Labour should tend to increase, while the
curves from the Conservatives and the Liberal
Democrats will tend to decrease. Nevertheless, this
exercise can still be informative since we are able to
check for peaks or dips in the estimated curves,
which would be an indication for tactical voting
and for the fact that people might do extremely well
in predicting election results. The left panel of Fig. 4
shows that there are clearly no signs for such a
behaviour in the data. The right panel – the Liberal
Democrats/Conservatives constituencies – exhibits
some minor variations in close seats, but it is actually
the reverse from what tactical voting would suggest,
with the Conservatives experiencing a peak relative
to 2005 results in precisely those seats that ended up
being close in 2010. Overall, it is clear that voters do
not seem to be characterized by perfect expectations,
a result that seems reasonable after all.
IV. Strategic Campaign Spending
We attributed the increase in votes for the Labour
party in close constituencies (as predicted by the
uniform swing model) to tactical voting. However,
party spending that is targeted towards close consti-
tuencies might be another causal mechanism that is
able to explain the observed patterns. In that case the
data would simply reﬂect increased (ﬁnancial) effort
by the two dominating parties. The literature on
campaign spending has made a distinction between
informative and persuasive campaign spending, see
Mueller and Stratmann (1994) and Westley and
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Fig. 3. Change in share in the Labour versus Conservatives seats (left) and Liberal Democrats versus
Conservatives seats (right), depending on the winning probability of Labour given by bookmakers. Local linear
regression, bandwidth selected by cross validation
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Fig. 4. Changes in the share in Labour versus Conservatives seats (left) and Liberal versus Conservatives seats
(right), depending on the Labour/Liberal/Conservative 2010 vote share difference. Local linear regression, band-
width selected by cross validation
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Calcagno (2005). The former term is used to denote
spending that aims to inform voters about the candi-
dates’ policy platform. The latter term indicates
spending intended to persuade voters to vote for the
given candidate regardless of the candidates’ policy
platform.25
Although previous studies have found only limited
evidence for tactical voting to be induced by party
spending,26 we examine this potential mechanism
here more closely. Rather than explaining the
observed pattern with party spending, research on
that matter has suggested that party spending inter-
acts with tactical voting behaviour, helping to trigger
or to moderate it.27
We investigate here whether party spending fol-
lowed the same patterns as the variations in the
parties’ shares. We employ detailed data from the
British Electoral Commission summarizing party
spending data at the constituency level. Figure 5 dis-
plays total party spending during the campaign for a
period from 1 January to 6 May 2010 of
Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats in
the marginal Labour/Conservatives seats as function
of the 2005–2010 vote share difference between
Labour and Conservatives in the top left panel. The
same graphs are depicted in the top right panel
whereas campaign spending is restricted to the
short-term period (starting on 13th April). The two
vertical lines indicate the interval in which a uniform
swing prediction identiﬁed the marginal constituen-
cies to be located. The two bottom panels of Fig. 5
display campaign spending and bookmakers winning
probabilities.
Spending of both, Labour Party and Conservatives,
peaks in districts where Conservatives gained around
5% to 10% in the 2010 elections and hence does not
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Fig. 5. Total party spending (left-hand side panels) and spending during the short campaign (right-hand side
panels) of Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats in the Labour/Conservatives constituencies, depending on
the Labour/Conservatives 2005 vote share difference (top panels), and the winning probability of Labour given by
bookmakers (bottom panels). Local linear regression, bandwidth selected by cross validation
25Another related but different literature deals with the question how effective campaign spending is and whether there are
differences in the effectiveness for incumbents relative to challengers. Among these papers are Levitt (1994), Gerber (1998)
and Stratmann (2006).
26 See Galbraith and Rae (1989), Johnston et al. (1997) and Fisher (2001), for example.
27 See Fieldhouse et al. (1996) and Pattie and Johnston (2010).
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exactly ﬁt a uniform swing model. Thus spending is
also not maximal between 10% and 15% where we
observe tactical voting.
The lower panels in Fig. 5 also clearly show that
both parties did not opt for spending strategies that
coincide with the bookmakers predictions, as their
total spending peaked for seats where the winning
probability for Labour was only estimated at 33% on
average. Restricting the sample to the short campaign
(lower right panel) tends to make the distribution of
spending even uniform across constituencies.
Overall, the data suggest that political parties tried
to target marginal seats, but did so somewhat imper-
fectly (if we deﬁne marginals using a uniform
national swing or bookmakers’ odds). In addition,
the data does not support the idea that voters simply
‘follow the money’ of the political parties.
Noticeably, there is no peak for the Conservative
vote share in the seats where their spending peaks.
Overall, the Conservative gains seem to be quite
insensitive to the amount of money spent for
campaigning.28 The absence of an effect could either
mean that Conservatives’ spending had no effect or
that it was balanced by Labour’s spending, resulting
in a wasteful ‘arms race’.
This does not necessarily imply that party spend-
ing does not matter for tactical voting.
Conceptually, the line between the effect of party
spending and tactical voting is a subtle one. First,
even if campaign spending is unable to change
voters’ preferences it can play an important role in
signalling the closeness of the race to the voters in
their constituencies. A large pecuniary effort by a
party in one constituency could transmit the infor-
mation that there is a close race expected, and thus
that tactical voting might be worthwhile. In this
situation, investments by the Conservative party
could even be counterproductive. Second, a party
could use its budget to run a political campaign
targeted at promoting tactical voting.
Our ﬁndings also relate to the issue of strategic
campaign contributions, for example, by political
action committees (PACs) in the United States. This
is an increasingly important topic since campaign
contributions have been sharply increasing in recent
years (Stratmann, 2005; Goel, 2014). Note that in the
United Kingdom, the spending of political parties
represents the bulk of the monetary resources allo-
cated in the campaign in favour of the local candi-
dates. This differs from a country like the United
States where private organizations such as PACs
provide additional funding to candidates or to the
causes they defend.
V. Controlling for Third Parties’ Distance
from Contention
Conventional wisdom29 suggests that tactical voting
is highest in seats that are closely contested. In con-
trast to that, Myatt (2007) in a recent study puts
another argument forward. He argues that once the
distance from contention of the third party is con-
trolled for, tactical voting should be largest in seats
where the leading party has the greatest advantage
against the runner-up.30 Myatt’s arguments is that it
is not marginality per se that is relevant for tactical
voting and that it is necessary to control for the role of
the distance from contention of the third party.
Assuming, for instance, a constituency where
Conservatives are expected to gain 30% of the
votes and Labour 28%, tactical voting behaviour of
Liberal–Democratic partisans will differ depending
on whether the Liberal Democrats can expect to
gather 10% or 27% of the electoral votes.
As a third contribution, this article tests the inter-
esting and somewhat counterintuitive prediction of
Myatt’s (2007) model regarding the importance of
tactical voting in marginal constituencies.31 Until
now, we simply restricted our sample to constituen-
cies where the third party was sufﬁciently behind
relative to the second party in order to avoid these
problems.32 We estimate a general additive model
(Breiman and Friedman, 1985) to control nonpara-
metrically for both the closeness of the race and for
the distance from contention. The vote share vp2010 of
28 This is in line with recent conjectures that the Conservatives are less effective in campaigning, see Pattie and
Johnston (2010), for example.
29But also some empirical studies, see, for example, Cain (1978).
30 See proposition 6 in Myatt (2007).
31Using a logit model to control for distance from contention of the third party, Fisher (2000) analyses survey data from the
British Election study and found some support for Myatt’s prediction for the years 1983 and 1987, but not for 1992 and
1997.
32 Please consult the ‘Appendix’ for more details on the sample selection.
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a party P in 2010 is speciﬁed as the sum of two
nonlinear and unknown functions, m1 and m2, of
the tightness of the race, t, and the distance from
contention of the third party in 2005, c:
where ε is a random error term.
vp2010 ¼ m1ðt2005Þ þ m2ðc2005Þ þ ε (1)
Figure 6 displays the results for the Labour/
Conservatives constituencies. Visual inspection of
the graph indicates that the results are in line with
those from Section III. Tactical voting still appears to
be prevalent in marginal seats, even after controlling
for distance from contention. Beyond the marginals,
tactical voting seems to be lower in seats dominated
by the Conservatives. This result contradicts the
predictions of the model that tactical voting
should increase with the winning margin of the
Conservatives. Relative to Fisher’s (2000) empirical
results, our estimation strategy has the advantage that
it imposes only minimal identifying assumptions on
the data-generating process (separable additivity).
Hence, our results support the commonly held view
that tactical voting is likely to be maximal in seats
that are tightly contested. In fact, it is also stronger in
marginals that are deﬁned using a uniform swing
model.
VI. Concluding Remarks
We contribute to the literature on tactical voting in
four different ways. First of all, we propose a novel
simple empirical strategy to identify tactical voting.
This method is based on the visual inspection of the
nonparametrically estimated relationship between
the change in vote shares between two elections
and the difference in vote shares between the two
major contesters in a certain district. We see our
method as useful and ﬂexible addition to the exist-
ing methods. As such, this approach is of general
importance and applicable in all similar situations.
It also avoids the disadvantages of the previous
methods. Applying this approach to the 2010
British general election, we ﬁnd that tactical voting
likely played a signiﬁcant role. Moreover, it seems
that mainly those voters who voted for the Liberals
in the preceding elections are prone to tactical vot-
ing, but not so much those who voted for the Labour
party beforehand.
Secondly, this article sheds new light on how
voters form their expectations about election out-
comes. Our method allows us to compare different
information acquisition approaches. We ﬁnd that
voters seem to calculate expected closeness of seats
mainly using a uniform swing model and not so
much from newspaper voting guides. Our results
−2
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−40 −20 0 20 40 60
Labour−Conservatives 2005 vote share difference
Cons. change Lab. change
Lib. change
Fig. 6. Additive model estimation. Change in vote shares as a function of Labour/Conservative vote share
differences after controlling for distance from contention
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therefore suggest a ‘partly sophisticated’ voter (as
opposed to a ‘sophisticated rational’ voter who
would rather follow bookmakers predictions or
even perfect forecasts and opposed to a naive voter
who is purely backward-looking).
Thirdly, we add to the literature on campaign spend-
ing by political parties. We have shown that parties try
to target marginal constituency with their campaign
spending, but are far from effective in doing so. We
also presented some evidence that the Conservative
party is particularly inefﬁcient in the use of its money.
In general, voters do not seem to be overly inﬂuenced
by campaigning effort of the parties.
Last but not least, we empirically test a prediction
of the theory of tactical voting as our approach allows
us to test and reject the claim that strategic voting
should be higher in constituencies where the
Conservatives have the highest vote edge once dis-
tance from contention is controlled for. We estimated
a general additive model that explicitly controls for
this distance. This supports our ﬁndings from the
sections before – we still ﬁnd that tactical voting
seems to be most likely at close races.
What can our results bring to the debate on the
electoral reform in Britain? Whilst the Gibbard–
Satterthwaite theorem states that there cannot be a
strategy-proof voting system, it is hard in practice to
compare how different systems would fare in regards
to that matter. The proportion of voters choosing to
vote strategically depends on the distribution of pre-
ferences and the relative positions of the candidates
in the political space.
Empirical comparative research on AV and FPTP
is relatively limited. Although tactical voting is gen-
erally associated with FPTP systems, it is well known
that tactical voting is also possible with AV
(Niemi, 1984). However, Bartholdi and
Orlin (1991) ﬁnd that the class of single transferable
vote (STV) voting rules, to which AV belongs,
should be more resistant to tactical voting as they
are characterized by a higher degree of complexity
for those voters looking for a tactical vote option. As
it happens, in Australia, a country that uses the alter-
native vote system, the proportion of tactical votes
has been estimated to be much smaller than in Britain
(Gschwend, 2004).
Related to this debate, our results seem to indicate
that voters (or at least some of them) are sophisti-
cated, but that they primarily use rather coarse
information sets (like the uniform swing mode) to
make predictions. As an argument in favour of AV is
made on the ground of its complexity, the degree of
sophistication of the electorate matters. With a
‘somewhat sophisticated’ electorate, for which we
ﬁnd some empirical evidence here, FPTP may be
easy enough for people to use public information to
deﬁne a tactical voting strategy. Under the AV sys-
tem, such voters may ﬁnd it too hard to come up with
the right tactical voting strategy. In that sense, our
results suggest that AV could reduce the proportion
of tactical voting by putting such an option out of
reach for most voters.
Finally, it is important to note that this study is not
able to say anything about the changes in tactical
voting over time. This question is important given
that new information technologies signiﬁcantly
reduce the costs of information acquisition and
hence facilitate tactical voting for the general
public.33
As a consequence, tactical voting may become
more prevalent over time. Clearly, more research
remains to be done.
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Appendix. Data
A.1 Redistricting and Notional Results
Asmentioned before, between the 2005 and the 2010
elections some constituencies were subject to redis-
tricting. To adjust for this fact, we employ the widely
used notional results by Rallings and
Thrasher (2007). The notional election result is an
estimate how the previous result would have looked
like given the new constituency boundaries.
Nevertheless, those estimates are not perfect since
they neglect tactical voting. In the following, we are
going to brieﬂy describe how these results are
calculated.
Constituencies are composed of electoral wards,
which were almost never cut during the change of
boundaries. Hence, notional results could in theory
be computed by re-assorting electoral wards.
However, in the British general elections, results are
not available on the ward- but only on the constitu-
ency-level. This is a direct consequence of how the
ballot papers are counted. The electoral commission
enforces a system in which all ballot boxes are ﬁrst
gathered in a central place in every constituency and
are then mixed before they are counted.
Notional results are therefore calculated with the
help of election results available on a ward level,
primarily local authority elections. Basically, the
number of votes obtained by party P in the new
constituency C’ is calculated as the sum of votes for
P at the local elections in all the wards that form the
2005 constituency C. The vote share of each party at
the 2005 national election is then divided by the sum
of the local election votes inC. This fractionF is used
as a multiplier for each C and P and applied to the
party’s vote in each ward that constituted C to obtain
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a notional 2005 general election result in that speciﬁc
ward. All votes in the wards making up the new
constituency C’ boundaries are then summed to get
the result for the corresponding constituency. In a
few cases, manual adjustments have been made.
A.2 Selection of the Sample of
Constituencies
As previously mentioned, we restrict the study to
Labour/Conservatives and Liberal Democrats/
Conservatives marginal seats. In order to study the
former for instance, we consider only the constitu-
encies where Labour and Conservatives arrived ﬁrst
and second (or second and ﬁrst, respectively) in
2005. We then drop all seats where those two parties
are not expected to remain the two dominating ones
in 2010. We combine the previous result with the
national swing to obtain these expectations. That is,
given the 2005 election result in a constituency
where Labour and Conservatives came ﬁrst and sec-
ond, we drop those constituencies where a national
vote swing would predict that at least one of the two
parties will not be ﬁrst or runner-up. We are left with
255 Labour/Conservative constituencies. We com-
pile the Liberal Democrats/Conservatives marginals
accordingly, but since Labour was expected to lose
ground and Conservatives and Liberal Democrats to
gain votes, we are not dropping any constituencies
here. That is, with expectations based on a national
vote swing, we will never see a constituency where
Liberals and Conservatives have been ﬁrst and sec-
ond, respectively, in 2005 but are not predicted to be
ﬁrst and second in 2010. As a result, we keep 126
Liberal Democrats/Conservatives marginal constitu-
encies. Hence, we use information from 381 out of
650 constituencies in total.
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